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Outstanding Constitutional and
International Law Issues Raised by the
United States-Puerto Rico Relationship
Juan R. Torruella†
This Article touches upon some issues of fundamental importance to the several million nationally disenfranchised
United States citizens that reside in Puerto Rico. I write with a
modicum of uneasiness as a result of the uncertain terrain on
which the United States-Puerto Rico relationship presently
finds itself, firstly, by reason of two cases that are pending resolution by the Supreme Court of the United States—Puerto Rico
1
v. Sánchez Valle and the consolidated cases of Puerto Rico v.
2
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust and Acosta-Febo v. Frank3
lin California Tax-Free Trust —which have already been argued and are awaiting decision, and secondly, because Congress is now considering legislation entitled the “Puerto Rico
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act,” referred
to by the uncomfortably inapt acronym “PROMESA”—
“promise” in Spanish—pursuant to which the Government of
Puerto Rico will be placed in virtual trusteeship by the U.S.
government.
Each of these cases and this legislation hold the potential
to drastically change the U.S.-P.R. scenario depending on
which of several paths the Court chooses to take in resolving
the basic questions the cases raise, and what it is that Congress
† Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The author recognizes the assistance of Rebecca Pilar Buckwalter-Poza and takes full, sole responsibility for the views expressed herein. Copyright © 2016 by Judge Juan
R. Torruella.
1. Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 192 D.P.R. 594 (P.R. 2015), petition for
cert. filed, 2015 WL 4498867 (U.S. July 17, 2015) (No. 15-108).
2. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir.
2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 5117977 (U.S. Aug. 21, 2015) (No. 15233).
3. Acosta-Febo v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir.
2015), petition for cert. filed, 2015 WL 5117977 (U.S. Aug. 26, 2015) (No. 15255).
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eventually enacts to “assist” the people of Puerto Rico. The final
product of the cases could run a gamut of results. What Congress will produce is anyone’s guess, but judging from the socalled “discussion draft” of PROMESA, it does not appear that
Puerto Rico is about to be released from the colonial grip of the
4
plenary powers that were authorized by the Insular Cases. Rather, it seems that Congress may tighten this grip to a virtual
stranglehold. This Article addresses several matters that may
serve as background when these cases are decided and Congress passes legislation.
I. INTRODUCTION: A PRESENTLY PROBLEMATIC STATE
OF AFFAIRS
Even as we proceed well into the twenty-first century and
this country actively promotes our democracy to the rest of the
world, we unfortunately do not always practice what we
preach. This is particularly true with reference to the constitutional and political rights of those who reside in our various
outlying non-state jurisdictions, in areas which we euphemistically refer to as “territories” or “possessions,” when they are, de
facto and de jure, colonies. There should be no question about
this asseveration as regards to American Samoa, Guam, or the
U.S. Virgin Islands, for which as recently as January 13th of
this year, the United States filed reports as required by Article
73(e) of the United Nations Charter, part of the U.N. Declara5
tion Regarding Non-Self Governing Territories.
4. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetz v. United States, 182
U.S. 221 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v.
United States,182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
Huus v. N.Y. & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
5. “Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a
full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of
the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred
trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of
the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end: . . . (e) to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and
other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible
other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.” U.N. Charter art. 73(e); see U.N. Secretary-General, Information from Non-SelfGoverning Territories Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter of the
United Nations: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/71/68 (Feb. 1,
2016), http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/68.
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Although the United States ceased filing these reports for
Puerto Rico in 1952 following representations to the United
Nations to the effect that Puerto Rico had become a selfgoverning entity by reason of the establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, these avowals did not represent the
true legal or constitutional situation when they were made, nor
have they become any more true at any time since then to the
6
present. Any doubt as to the veracity of this assertion may be
dispelled by consulting the amicus brief filed by the Solicitor
General on behalf of the United States before the Supreme
Court in Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, in which the United
States argues that the approval of self-government for Puerto
Rico in 1952 did not change Puerto Rico’s fundamental constitutional status as a U.S. territory subject to the paramount au7
thority of Congress under the Territorial Clause.
A perhaps even more poignant and present example of
Congress’s colonial control and relationship to Puerto Rico lies
with the proposed PROMESA legislation, which, among other
things, would establish a so-called “Oversight Board,” a non8
elected entity of seven members appointed by the President.
This Board will have the power to impose a deadline on the
Government of Puerto Rico for developing a fiscal plan and
budget that meet Congress’s criteria—as well as the right to re9
ject Puerto Rico’s proposals and substitute its own instead.
Puerto Rico will not be represented on the Oversight Board:
Unlike the previous version of the legislation, which suggested
that at least two of the then-five members of the Board must
already live or have a primary place of business in Puerto Rico
to be appointed, the version introduced in the House on April
12, 2016 only requires that one member “shall maintain a primary residence . . . or have a primary place of business” in
Puerto Rico, leaving open the possibility of filling this slot with
10
anyone willing to move to Puerto Rico to satisfy that criterion.
6. See JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO:
THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 133–67 (1985); JOSÉ TRÍAS
MONGE, PUERTO RICO: THE TRIALS OF THE OLDEST COLONY IN THE WORLD
121–22 (1997); see also Juan R. Torruella, Hacia dónde vas Puerto Rico?, 107
YALE L.J. 1503, 1514–18 (1998) (reviewing MONGE, supra).
7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 16–19, Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, No. 15-108 (Dec. 23, 2015) (citing
Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 354 (1907)).
8. H.R. 4900, 114th Cong. § 101(e)(1) (draft introduced Apr. 12, 2016).
9. Id. § 201.
10. Id. § 101(e)(2).
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Although the Governor is nominally part of the Board, he is on11
ly an “ex officio” member without any voting rights. The legislation also gives the Board the prerogative to demand any information and documentation it believes may be relevant from
12
the Government of Puerto Rico and requires the Puerto Rico
legislature to submit all acts it passes, along with estimates of
their cost, to the Oversight Board for evaluation in short or13
der. If the Board determines that an act is not consistent with
the approved fiscal plan, it may unilaterally dictate that the act
be changed or simply overrule the Government of Puerto Rico
14
to block its enforcement or application. The Board may also
require the Government of Puerto Rico to submit all contracts
15
and leases to the Board for approval. And, of course, Puerto
Rico will also have to get the Board’s approval before it can “issue debt or guarantee, exchange, modify, repurchase, redeem,
16
or enter into similar transactions with respect to its debt.”
Of course, this is not PROMESA’s only egregious
stipulation. Tucked into the legislation is another provision
that is perhaps even more pernicious to Puerto Rico and its
people’s future, given the Island’s limited land and natural resources. Section 405 would open up thousands of acres of protected land to private development by permitting the Secretary
17
of the Interior to convey it to Puerto Rico to sell. Even the Sec18
retary of the Interior has condemned this provision.
The PROMESA legislation is just the latest chapter in
Puerto Rico’s interminable colonial tutelage. There is more
damning evidence throughout history of the United States’ hold
over Puerto Rico. Review of this evidence and relationship
demonstrates that Puerto Rico’s present woes were not only
foreseeable but inevitable given the social, economic, and political processes to which Puerto Rico and its inhabitants have
been subjected under the sovereignty of the United States.

11. Id. § 101(e)(3).
12. Id. § 104(c)(2).
13. Id. § 204(a)(1)–(2).
14. Id. § 204(a)(5).
15. Id. § 204(b)(2).
16. Id. § 207.
17. Id. § 405.
18. Danica Coto, US Official Warns Puerto Rico Resources Targeted Amid
Crisis, YAHOO (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-interior
-secretary-visits-puerto-rico-unveil-project-151937605.html.
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II. THE TRAGIC TRANSITION TO U.S. SOVEREIGNTY
AND ITS SEQUELAE
The story of Puerto Rico’s present condition begins, in
truth, with the Treaty of Paris of 1898, which ended the Spanish-American War. In providing for the cession of Puerto Rico
from Spain to the United States, the Treaty stated in Article IX
that “[t]he civil rights and political status of the native inhabit19
ants . . . shall be determined by the Congress.” This provision
was contrary to the unwavering practice and prevalent constitutional law up to then regarding all other territorial acquisitions by the United States. In all prior cases, upon acquiring
additional territory, U.S. citizenship and rights were granted to
the inhabitants of the newly acquired lands, irrespective of the
20
means used to add those territories to the nation’s domain.
The new practice instituted after the Spanish-American
War effected not only a departure from past practice by the
United States but a retrogression from how things were in
Puerto Rico during Spanish rule, under which the Island was a
province of Spain (the equivalent of a state under the U.S. form
of government), and Puerto Ricans were full Spanish citizens
with the right to elect sixteen delegates and three senators to
21
the Spanish Cortes (the equivalent of our Congress).
Shortly after his arrival at the head of the invading forces
General Miles had proclaimed to the Puerto Rican population
that the United States would “promote [their] prosperity and
19. Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754 [hereinafter
Treaty of Paris].
20. For example, after the Mexican-American War, just fifty years before,
residents of the newly acquired territory were given the choice between declaring a preference to retain Mexican citizenship and automatically becoming
U.S. citizens by staying in the territory for one year. See Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922; Mae M. Ngai, Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2521, 2527
(2007).
21. FERNANDO BAYRÓN TORO, HISTORIA DE LAS ELECCIONES Y LOS
PARTIDOS POLITICOS DE PUERTO RICO 3 (1977); see 330 GACETA DE MADRID
Tomo IV 625, 625 (Nov. 26, 1897) (Sp.) (publication of decree providing for
Spanish residents of the Antilles the same rights as the inhabitants of the
Spanish peninsula); Real Decreto, 298 GACETA DE PUERTO RICO 2, 2–3 (Dec.
16, 1897) (Sp.) (Title I through IV of decree); Real Decreto (Continuación), 299
GACETA DE PUERTO RICO 1, 1–2 (Dec. 17, 1897) (Sp.) (Title V through title
VIII); Real Decreto (Conclusión), 300 GACETA DE PUERTO RICO 1, 1 (Dec. 18,
1897) (Sp.) (Title IX through end); see also REPORT OF THE TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE LAKE MOHONK CONFERENCE OF FRIENDS OF THE
INDIAN AND OTHER DEPENDENT PEOPLES 176 (1908).
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bestow the immunities and blessings of [U.S. enlightenment]
22
and the liberal institutions of our Government.” The United
States instead imposed a military regime that abolished all
forms of democratic representation in local government. Furthermore, despite Miles’s bombastic promises, the colonial powers negotiated the Treaty of Paris and enacted Article IX without Puerto Rican participation or even consultation. The treaty
and its Article IX were announced to Puerto Rico’s inhabitants
as a fait accompli, in which they were stripped of their Spanish
citizenship and rights and required to give allegiance to a new
colonial overseer under whom they would be without any rights
except those that Congress, in which they had no vote, chose to
grant in the future. As a matter of American constitutional law,
Article IX was clearly unconstitutional, for as Justice Kennedy
stated in Boumediene v. Bush, “[t]he Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and
govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its
23
terms apply.” It does not take a rocket scientist to conclude
that neither the Treaty of Paris nor any treaty can trump, so to
speak, the Constitution by granting Congress powers that exceed those allowed by that document.
Unfortunately, however, the negotiation of the Treaty of
Paris and its implementation coincided with a period of imperialist euphoria. The dominant political figures in the United
States were enthusiastic exponents of the concept of Manifest
Destiny, which promoted American exceptionalism and the expectation that the United States, “thanks to the superior qualities of the Anglo-Saxons . . . and to their democratic institu24
tions, would inevitably absorb their neighbours [sic].”
The United States was not writing on a clean slate. What
the United States could constitutionally do with territories it
acquired had been categorically established by the Supreme
Court back in 1856. In the much maligned (for other reasons)
Dred Scott v. Sandford case, Chief Justice Roger Taney had
written:
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the ad-

22. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MAJOR-GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF WAR 31–32 (1898).

COMMANDING THE ARMY TO

23. 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).
24. HUGH THOMAS, CUBA, OR THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM 211 (1971).
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mission of new States . . . . [N]o power is given to acquire a Territory
25
to be held and governed permanently [in a colonial] character.

Perhaps equally important, the Sandford Court went on to
rule that the Territorial Clause in Article IV of the Constitu26
tion was not applicable to territories acquired after the U.S.’s
independence from Great Britain. Chief Judge Taney held that
the Territorial Clause was only relevant to those lands held at
27
the time of the treaty with Great Britain in 1783, namely the
28
Old Northwest Territories, but did not apply to land acquired
thereafter. The Court further ruled in 1886, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal rights
to “all persons within the territorial jurisdiction [of the United
States], without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
29
nationality.” But these rulings, this vital precedent, would be
disregarded.
Historian Rubin Francis Weston cogently describes what
actually happened in the political arena of the times in his
book, Racism in U.S. Imperialism:
Those who advocated overseas expansion faced this dilemma: What
kind of relationship would the new peoples have to the body politic?
Was it to be the relationship of the Reconstruction period, an attempt
at political equality for dissimilar races, or was it to be the Southern
“counterrevolutionary” point of view which denied the basic American
constitutional rights to people of color? The actions of the federal government during the imperial period and the relegation of the Negro to
a status of second-class citizenship indicated that the Southern point
of view would prevail. The racism which caused the relegation of the
Negro to a status of inferiority was to be applied to the overseas pos30
sessions of the United States.

The advent of this racially charged imperialistic mania instigated the sharp departure from the past practice to which
this Article earlier alluded.

25. 60 U.S. 393, 446 (1856) (emphasis added).
26. “The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful
rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to
prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular state.” U.S.
CONST. art IV, § 3.
27. See Definitive Treaty of Peace Between the United States of America
and His Britannic Majesty, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
28. 60 U.S. at 446–47; see Northwest Ordinance of 1789, 1 Stat. 50, 51
(1789).
29. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (emphasis added).
30. RUBIN FRANCIS WESTON, RACISM IN U.S. IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1893–1946, at
15 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
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The transition was not without dissent. The 1899 report of
the Carroll Commission, appointed by President McKinley to
investigate prevailing conditions in Puerto Rico, concluded that
there should be “no hesitation in affirming that the people [of
Puerto Rico] have good claims to be considered capable of self31
government.” Unfortunately, the military governor of Puerto
Rico, General Davis, challenged the Commission’s recommendations, stating that “[t]he people [of Puerto Rico] generally
have no conception of political rights combined with political
32
responsibilities.”
An acrimonious debate in Congress followed, and that body
sided with General Davis. The decision was greatly influenced
by considerations of how a progressive resolution of Puerto Rico’s case could affect the companion bill dealing with the Philippines, as to which one senator warned that we should “beware of those mongrels of the East, with breath of pestilence
33
and touch of leprosy.” With this pernicious atmosphere as
background, Congress proceeded to enact the Foraker Act of
34
1900. Through this Act, Congress accomplished its two most
pressing goals: creating a colonial apparatus to replace the military regime that had ruled Puerto Rico since its invasion and
raising money to fund this new administration.
This statute provided for the establishment of a civil government composed of a presidentially appointed governor, a
supreme court, and an upper legislative body, with a lower
35
house elected by the Puerto Ricans. Importantly, it also established a tax on goods imported into Puerto Rico from the mainland United States, the proceeds of which would be used to defray the expenses of the newly established territorial
36
government. Because such a tax was alleged to violate the
uniformity provision of the Taxing and Spending Clause of the

31. HENRY K. CARROLL, REPORT ON THE ISLAND OF PORTO RICO, SPECIAL
COMMISSION FOR THE UNITED STATES ON PORTO RICO 56–58 (U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1899).
32. GEORGE W. DAVIS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT: REPORT OF THE MILITARY GOVERNOR OF PORTO RICO ON CIVIL AFFAIRS, VOL. 1,
PT. 13, at 19–20 (U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1900).
33. 33 CONG. REC. 3616 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1900) (statement of Sen. Bate);
see also id. at 3613.
34. 31 Stat. 77 (1900) (described as “[a]n Act Temporarily to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes”).
35. Id. at 81–84.
36. Id. at 78.
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37

Constitution, it was challenged as unconstitutional, and thus
38
came about the Insular Cases, which presented the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to define the relationship between
the United States and Puerto Rico—and determine Congress’s
power over the latter.
The Supreme Court, which was almost to a man the same
Court that had validated racial segregation in the South in
39
Plessy v. Ferguson, just five years before in 1896, harked the
imperialists’ clarion call, and answered with rulings that endorsed their undemocratic ideology and licensed Congress’s efforts to realize its ideals in its governance of the United States’
new colonial empire.
The Supreme Court not only totally ignored the controlling
40
precedent of Loughborough v. Blake, decided in 1820, which
had unqualifiedly determined that the proscription against
non-uniformity in taxation applied to the territories—in that
case, the District of Columbia—but, in a perhaps an even more
opprobrious action, side-stepped the explicit and unambiguous
constitutional precept pronounced by Chief Judge Taney
unequivocally prohibiting the establishment or maintenance of
colonies by the United States. Instead of following these precedents, the Court gave its benediction to the creation by Congress of an American colonial system under the guise of something invented by the Court out of thin air, the so-called
doctrine of territorial incorporation. Pursuant to this theory,
the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, as denizens of an “unincorporated territory,” were to be denied all but the most fundamental constitutional protections and Congress was granted almost
unlimited plenary powers. The so-called PROMESA congressional proposal is only the latest example of how Congress still
exercises these powers over the unincorporated territories and
their inhabitants. There have been many other manifestations
throughout the 116 years of U.S. colonial rule established by
the Insular Cases.
Puerto Rico’s status has not changed an iota over this period, nor has that of its citizens. Just five years after Puerto Ri-

37. That clause concludes, “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1.
38. See supra note 4.
39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820).
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41

cans were granted U.S. citizenship in 1917, the Supreme
42
Court ruled, quite incredibly, in Balzac v. Porto Rico, that all
the granting of U.S. citizenship meant for Puerto Ricans was
that they could move to the Mainland and there exercise full
rights as citizens, but that they were not entitled to the full
rights of U.S. citizens while residing in Puerto Rico—such as,
in the Balzac case, the right to trial by jury.
If another ludicrous example of this proposition is needed,
consider the author—a U.S. Court of Appeals judge, sitting on
the second-highest court of the United States, voting and deciding cases that have national import—who, because he resides
in Puerto Rico, where he was born and has roots, cannot vote
for President or Vice President or claim representation in the
legislative body that passes the laws that govern and touch
every facet of life in Puerto Rico. Forgetting, for a moment, all
concepts of equal protection, due process, or even fairness, does
this make any sense?
III. THE COLONIAL CONDITION THAT CAUSED PUERTO
RICO’S PRESENT CRISIS
The term “colony” is defined by UNESCO’s Dictionary of
the Social Sciences as “a territory, subordinate in various
ways—political, cultural, or economic—to a more developed
country [in which] [s]upreme legislative power and much of the
administration rest[s] with the controlling country, which [is]
43
usually of a different ethnic group from the colony.” One
would have to be seriously impaired in every sense to conclude
that this definition does not fit the U.S.-P.R. relationship like a
glove.
This irrefutable colonial condition, the direct result of the
Insular Cases and the regime that they legalized, continues to
44
dictate the fate of the Island and its inhabitants today. Any
attempt to divest or bypass this denigrating status as the cause
for its present predicament is at best delusive. It is the forerunner, underlying cause, and current catalyst of the economic
debacle in which Puerto Rico finds itself, for it has enabled, if
not promoted, significant and ongoing economic exploitation by
41. Jones Act (Puerto Rico), Pub. L. No. 64-368, ch. 145, § 5, 39 Stat. 951,
951–52 (1917) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 737 (1994)).
42. 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
43. A DICTIONARY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 102 (Julius Gould & William
Kolb eds., 1964).
44. See generally MONGE, supra note 6.
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American capital to the detriment of Puerto Rico and its citizens—since day one.
The years between 1900 and 1945 may be referred to as
the crypto-plantation period. Prior to that, towards the end of
the Spanish regime, coffee had been Puerto Rico’s principal
crop. Coffee acreage was twice that planted with sugar cane,
more than ninety percent of farms were worked by those who
45
owned them, and these farms averaged five acres in size.
Then, by 1900, Puerto Rico became one huge sugar plantation,
mostly exploited by mega-enterprises from the Mainland, the
largest of which were based in Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
46
New York. Sugar cane acreage almost tripled from what it
47
was in 1896, and, by 1917, a relatively small number of individuals, partnerships, and corporations owned almost all of the
48
arable lowland of Puerto Rico. The Island’s economy and population became totally dependent on that one crop, with the
raw sugar cane being turned into molasses and shipped in bulk
49
to the Mainland for refinement into table sugar.
These sugar giants produced dividends as high as 115% on
50
investment, with the four largest boasting an average return
51
on investment between 1923 and 1930 of 22.5%. Three of these sugar growers distributed more than $60 million in dividends to their stockholders between 1920 and 1935—more than
52
$1 billion in today’s dollars. The vast majority of the earnings
produced from the work of the local labor left Puerto Rico, never to be seen again.

45. See DEPT. OF AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE, SAN JUAN, ANNUAL
BOOK ON STATISTICS OF PUERTO RICO, FISCAL YEAR 1947–48, at 282 tbl.139
(1948); see also ARTURO MORALES CARRIÓN, PUERTO RICO: A POLITICAL AND
CULTURAL HISTORY 137 (1983).
46. See MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 174. The Central Aguirre
Sugar Company, a Massachusetts trust, was at times the largest sugar company in the world. That connection to Massachusetts is most likely the reason
why Puerto Rico was placed in the First Circuit.
47. Id. at 217.
48. Id. at 216–17; see also BAILEY W. DIFFIE & JUSTINE WHITFIELD
DIFFIE, PORTO RICO: A BROKEN PLEDGE 46–50 (1931); Judd Polk, The Plight of
Puerto Rico, 57 POL. SCI. Q. 481, 482–503 (1942).
49. The various Sugar Acts, among other things, assigned production quotas to various sugar-producing areas with which Puerto Rico was unable to
compete economically.
50. MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 217.
51. JAMES L. DIETZ, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF PUERTO RICO: INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE AND CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT 110 (1986).
52. Id.
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The crypto-plantation period created a large landless population, which lived below the poverty level, barely above subsistence requirements. The rural population was eighty percent
53
landless. Although between 1915 and 1925 wages in the sugar
industry went up from 60 cents per day to $1.00 per day, the
cost of a minimum family diet in the sugar producing areas was
54
55.5 cents per day.
The Puerto Rican sugar industry, despite paying its work
force miserably low wages, could not compete with other sugarproducing areas without substantial assistance from the federal government. This sugar-related dependence on federal aid
was the beginning of a pattern of reliance on federal crutches of
various kinds that increased exponentially, becoming a “permanent” feature of the Puerto Rican economy and eventually
contributing to its collapse.
In 1930, the annual per capita income in Puerto Rico was
55
one-fifth that of the Mainland, just $122. Over the next three
years, it shrank to just $85 as a result of the Great Depres56
sion. In the face of near-famine conditions, and with agricul57
tural work limited to only part of the year, the landless rural
58
population flocked to the cities, particularly to San Juan.
Huge slums emerged, with as many as 100,000 people living in
59
dismal conditions, totally overpowering the ability of local
government to provide aid or respite. As described by one
Stateside observer:
I saw, in short, misery, disease, squalor, filth. It would be lamentable
enough to see this anywhere . . . . But to see it on American territory,
among people whom the United States has governed since 1898, in a
region for which our federal responsibility has been complete for 43

53. MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 243. The rural population constituted nearly seventy percent of Puerto Rico’s population of almost 1,900,000 at
the time. Id.
54. SAKARI SARIOLA, THE PUERTO RICAN DILEMMA 92 (1979). The average
male worker in the United States earned approximately $1.88 per day in 1915.
The Life of American Workers in 1915, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS (Feb. 2016),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/the-life-of-american-workers-in-1915
.htm#_ednref81.
55. MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 243.
56. Id.
57. The field workers, who constituted the great majority of those employed in the sugar industry, could only find work during the four or five
months of the year that the harvesting of sugar cane took place.
58. Marjorie Ruth Clark, Our Own Puerto Rico, 4 ANTIOCH REV. 383, 389
(1944).
59. Id.
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years, is a paralyzing jolt to anyone who believes in American stand60
ards of progress and civilization.

Food for thought, given the present circumstances.
From 1898 to 1933, the United States spent less than
61
three-quarters of a million dollars in Puerto Rico per year.
Over the same period, American private enterprise converted
Puerto Rico into a captive market. By 1910, nearly all of Puerto
62
Rico’s exports went to the Mainland, a pattern that has hardly
63
changed to this day. By the 1940s, Puerto Rico would be one of
the United States’ top customers as well as one of its top sup64
pliers of raw goods. The sugar-era pattern persisted, with
raw-materials exports produced by the colony exchanged for
finished-goods imports from the metropolis, promoting an increasingly negative balance of payments against the colonial
65
side.
As if that were not enough, the Merchant Marine Act of
66
1920, also called the Jones Act, requires all maritime cargo
transported between the Island and the Mainland to be carried
on U.S.-built ships, manned by U.S. crews, both of which are
67
the most expensive in the maritime field. This, of course, results in raising the cost of everything shipped to and from
Puerto Rico, including food stuffs and other essentials, and
places goods produced in Puerto Rico at a competitive disad68
vantage. To this day, it costs twice as much to ship goods from
60. JOHN GUNTHER, INSIDE LATIN AMERICA 423 (1941).
61. Clark, supra note 58, at 388.
62. MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 173.
63. Puerto Rico Trade, Exports and Imports, ECONOMY WATCH (Mar. 30,
2010),
http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/puerto-rico/export
-import.html.
64. Polk, supra note 48, at 485.
65. Id. at 490.
66. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-261, 41 Stat. 988, 999
(1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 55101–55122).
67. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. MAR. ADMIN., COMPARISON OF U.S. AND
FOREIGN-FLAG OPERATING COSTS (2011) (examining reasons for significantly
higher operating costs of U.S.-flag vessels and comparing costs with those of
foreign-flag vessels); cf. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ISLAND’S MARITIME TRADE AND POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF MODIFYING THE JONES ACT 28–29 (2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653046.pdf
(acknowledging the Jones Act “may result in higher freight rates” but claiming
“it is not possible to measure the extent to which rates in this trade are higher
than they otherwise would be” and concluding “the law has helped to ensure
reliable, regular service . . . important to the Puerto Rican economy”).
68. Rory Carroll, The US Shipping Industry Is Putting a Multimillion
Dollar Squeeze on Puerto Rico, REUTERS (July 9, 2015), http://www
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the East Coast to Puerto Rico as it does to send them to the
69
Dominican Republic or Jamaica.
The arrival of the New Deal to Puerto Rico, and, shortly
thereafter, the entry of the United States into World War II,
70
brought some respite to this stricken land. Sugarcane workers’ wages doubled from 1940 to 1945, to a whopping thirty
71
cents an hour, and unemployment fell from eighteen percent
72
in 1940 to thirteen percent by 1950. This decrease in unemployment was the result of direct expenditures by the federal
73
government of more than $257 million from 1933 to 1942, an
apparent change in policy brought about by the anticipation of
World War II and the need to fortify Puerto Rico to protect the
southern flank of the United States and approaches to the Panama Canal.
Puerto Rico became a virtual military camp. The military
expropriated vast tracks of land and eventually occupied fourteen percent of the total land area of Puerto Rico, the greatest
proportion of land occupied by the military in any U.S. jurisdic74
tion. Many military bases were located on prime agricultural
and touristic locales. On two off-shore civilian-inhabited Islandmunicipalities, Vieques and Culebra, the U.S. Navy conducted
air and naval bombardments as well as amphibious operations
for the next sixty years, notwithstanding decades of opposition
by successive local administrations. In 1999, when this opposition erupted into massive civic protests after a civilian was
killed by one of the bombing sorties, the Navy finally discontinued their bombing operations—but retaliated against the local
population by closing down all of its bases in Puerto Rico over75
night, greatly disrupting the Island’s economy. To this day,
.businessinsider.com/r-us-shippers-push-back-in-battle-over-puerto-rico
-import-costs-2015-7.
69. FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON THE COMPETITIVENESS
OF PUERTO RICO’S ECONOMY 13 (2012).
70. See REXFORD GUY TUGWELL, THE STRICKEN LAND: THE STORY OF
PUERTO RICO (1968).
71. TORRUELLA, supra note 6, at 237 tbl.23.
72. Id. at 244 tbl.27.
73. Id. at 239; see National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 73-67, 48
Stat. 195 (1933) (previously codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 703–712
(2012)), invalidated by A.L.A Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States, 295
U.S. 495 (1935).
74. JUAN GONZÁLEZ, HARVEST OF EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF LATINOS IN
AMERICA 252 (2000).
75. Puerto Rico Braces for the Base Closing, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2004),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/apr/1/20040401-123456-9250r.
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the U.S. government refuses to adequately clean up or compensate residents for the environmental, ecological, and health
76
damages inflicted by the military operations. As legal actions
proved unsuccessful, the residents have been left with no recourse but to petition Congress for relief—a course unlikely to
77
yield results, to put it politely.
The end of the Second World War and the creation of United Nations, with its purported anti-colonial stance codified in
78
its Charter, opened up new prospects for many colonized peoples. The United States, being a principal sponsor of the United
Nations and of decolonization by Great Britain and France, was
forced to publicly reevaluate its relationship with Puerto Rico
and its U.S. citizen inhabitants. Congress took a strategic step
in that direction in 1950 by enacting Public Law 600, which authorized Puerto Ricans to draft their own local constitution sub79
ject to congressional approval. Congress subsequently approved, after some edits, a Puerto Rican constitution that
80
afforded a limited measure of self-government, which included
the right to elect a governor and legislature, as well as to appoint local government officials, including judges.
What followed was a rush to the United Nations by the
United States to seek a dispensation for Puerto Rico from U.N.
reporting requirements imposed on those countries with nonself-governing territories. This was accomplished by much chicanery and arm-twisting by the representatives of the United
States, in collusion with some leading Puerto Rican politi81
cians, a feat described by some, accurately, as “a monumental
82
hoax.” For although these actions resulted in the removal of

76. COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS, CLEARING OUT WITHOUT CLEANUP: THE U.S. AND VIEQUES ISLAND (May 19, 2011), http://www.coha.org/
clearing-out-without-cleaning-up-the-u-s-and-vieques-island.
77. See Abreu v. United States, 468 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2006).
78. See U.N. Charter art. 73.
79. Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, 64 Stat. 319 (codified at 48
U.S.C. § 731b (1994)).
80. Act of July 3, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-447, 66 Stat. 327.
81. See TORRUELLA, supra note 6, at 160–67.
82. El Gobernador pide a Rice que enmiende el informe sobre el estatus
político de P.Rico, YAHOO NEWS (Nov. 19, 2007, 12:01 PM), http://web.archive
.org/web/20080110063744/http://espanol.news.yahoo.com/s/19112007/54/eeuu
-gobernador-pide-rice-enmiende-informe-estatus-pol-tico-p.html (“Acevedo Vilá
aseguró que si Rice no enmienda esas conclusiones ‘debe notificar a las
Naciones Unidas que Estados Unidos le mintió o ignoró la relación de Estado
Libre Asociado que fue instituida en el 1953’, lo que ‘ha perpetuado un engaño
ING
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Puerto Rico from the U.N. colonial list, Public Law 600 was, at
best, a cosmetic measure. We citizens of Puerto Rico continue to
be disenfranchised nationally, unable to vote for the President
or Vice President, or to be represented in Congress by voting
representatives and senators, and thus have no say regarding
the laws that apply to us.
At about the time Public Law 600 was being enacted, the
sugar industry finally died in Puerto Rico, a victim of the increased costs of production and competition from other sugar83
producing areas. This formed the impetus behind “Operation
Bootstrap,” a joint project of the federal and Puerto Rico governments designed to create a new industrial base for the Is84
land. As a result of this program, Puerto Rico’s industrial base
grew exponentially over the next forty years.
Between 1960 and 1976, direct U.S. investment in Puerto
Rico skyrocketed, and Puerto Rico accounted for forty percent
85
of all profits by U.S. companies in Latin America. This bonanza was facilitated by special federal and Puerto Rico tax provisions that partially or completely exempted U.S. corporations
86
operating in Puerto Rico from taxation. It would be further
87
fueled by Section 936 of the Internal Revenue Code, passed in
1976, which, with the explicit aim of creating jobs in Puerto Rico and other territories, extended even greater tax incentives to
U.S. corporations that could show the vast majority of their in88
come was derived from sources in a “possession.” By 1977 several major multinational corporations were reporting that more
than a quarter of their worldwide profits came from their Puer89
to Rico operations. Chemical and pharmaceutical companies
benefited most from the Section 936 shelter: Johnson & Johnson, Smith-Kline, Merck, and Bristol-Myers alone saved bil90
lions in taxes between 1980 and 1990.
monumental’ en los boricuas, los estadounidenses y la comunidad
internacional.”).
83. See MORALES CARRIÓN, supra note 45, at 243–44.
84. Id. at 269–70, 286; see also TORRUELLA, supra note 6, at 240–41.
85. EMILIO PANTOJAS-GARCÍA, DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES AS IDEOLOGY:
PUERTO RICO’S EXPORT-LED INDUSTRIALIZATION EXPERIENCE 115–18 (1990).
86. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX POLICY: PUERTO RICO AND THE
SECTION 936 TAX CREDIT 2–3 (1993) [hereinafter PUERTO RICO AND SECTION
936].
87. I.R.C. § 936(a)(1) (1996) (repealed 1996).
88. PUERTO RICO AND SECTION 936, supra note 86.
89. PANTOJAS-GARCÍA, supra note 85, at 153.
90. See Kelly Richmond, Drug Companies Fear Loss of Tax Exemption,
N.J. RECORD, Nov. 8, 1993 (on file with Minnesota Law Review).
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But these halcyon days would come to an end as a result of
corporate greed. Firms with high research, development, and
marketing expenses but low production costs transferred their
production, patents, and trademarks to subsidiaries in Puerto
Rico to shield all revenue produced by these products from fed91
eral income taxes. Although these manipulations turned
Puerto Rico into U.S. capital’s number-one profit center in the
world, they also cost the federal government nearly $3 billion in
92
lost tax revenues per year some years. Of course, as in the
case of the sugar industry, little if any of the Section 936 industries’ profit remained on the Island.
In large part as a result of the Section 936 corporations’
abuse of the exemption, Congress decided to do something
93
about Section 936 in 1996. Unfortunately, instead of closing
the loophole, Congress eliminated the provision altogether.
This resulted in most Section 936 companies relocating to taxfree areas such as Ireland and NAFTA-favored countries, such
as Mexico. The corporations took the jobs they had created—
the real reason for the enactment of Section 936 in the first
place—and any chance that Puerto Rico would recover from the
economic havoc wrought by the sugar industry with them, leaving thousands out of work and plunging Puerto Rico’s economy
into a downward spiral.
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY CONSEQUENCES OF
COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO
In the throes of its so-called “death spiral,” Puerto Rico’s
present economy has become even more dependent on U.S.
transfers. The Island receives approximately $16 billion annu94
ally in U.S. government subsidies and assistance. But the balance of trade between Puerto Rico and the Mainland remains
the same: About ninety percent of Puerto Rico exports go to the
United States, and the Mainland is in turn responsible for a
95
similar proportion of imports. The totality of this sequence of
91. See PUERTO RICO AND SECTION 936, supra note 86, at 3.
92. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY TAX
BENEFITS OF OPERATING IN PUERTO RICO 14 (1992).
93. See Milo Peck & Helen W. Johns, The Death of Section 936: Closing a
Loophole or Poor Policy?, 22 INT’L TAX J. 1 (1996); Angel L. Ruíz Mercado &
Edwin Meléndez, The Potential Impact of the Repeal of Section 936 on Puerto
Rico’s Economy: Summary, BOLETÍN DE ECONOMÍA, July-Sept. 1997, at 4, 4–10.
94. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, FINANCIAL INFORMATION AND OPERATING DATA REPORT 18 (2013).
95. See GONZÁLEZ, supra note 74, at 85, Robert Z. Lawrence & Juan Lara,
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events, commencing with the sugar economy era to the present,
and current state of affairs render Puerto Rico—which has contributed more wealth to the United States than any country in
history and is one of the largest captive markets of U.S.
goods—a conduit for the federal government to subsidize U.S.
industry, as subsidies to the Island are inevitably repatriated
when Puerto Ricans buy Mainland-made products with these
funds. In view of this fact of U.S. economic life, it is particularly
ironic that Congress discriminates against Puerto Rico and its
citizens in the parceling out of these monies.
The discriminatory imbalance in subsidies to Puerto Rico’s
U.S. citizens versus their Mainland counterparts is long96
standing and, unfortunately, judicially sanctioned. The Supreme Court has justified Congress’s discriminatory treatment
of the U.S. residents of Puerto Rico in two cases—Harris v. Ro97
98
sario and Califano v. Torres —by reasoning that “greater
99
benefits could disrupt the Puerto Rican economy”! This is a
conclusion that Justice Marshall understandably rejected as
tantamount to saying that Congress meant to help the poorest
100
the least and to keep Puerto Rico at a disadvantage.
Even today, Puerto Rico receives only a fraction of the fed101
eral support extended to Mainland counterparts. For example, Puerto Rico receives little more than a tenth of the amount
of Medicaid funding that is sent to wealthier states with simi102
lar or smaller populations. And in Puerto Rico, Medicare reimbursement rates are just sixty percent of Mainland rates; the
103
same is true of Medicare Advantage. Overall, annual per enrollee spending on Medicare and Medicaid in Puerto Rico is the

Trade Performance and Industrial Policy, in THE ECONOMY OF PUERTO RICO:
RESTORING GROWTH 507, 528–31 (Susan M. Collins et al. eds., 2006).
96. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1308(a)(1), 1396d(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2012)
(aid to families with dependent children); 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–306 (2012) (benefits programs for the aged); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201–1206 (2012) (for the blind); 42
U.S.C. §§ 1351–1355 (2012) (for the disabled); 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (2012) (Supplemental Social Security program for the aged, blind, and disabled).
97. 446 U.S. 651 (1980) (per curiam).
98. 435 U.S. 1 (1978) (per curiam).
99. 446 U.S. at 652.
100. Id. at 655–56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. See Lizette Alvarez & Abby Goodnough, Puerto Ricans Brace for Crisis
in Health Care, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes/com/2015/08/
03/us/health-providers-brace-for-more-cuts-to-medicare-in-puerto-rico.html.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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104

lowest in the United States. This situation is a major component of Puerto Rico’s financial woes, as the local government is
forced to cover Puerto Rico’s health care funding shortfalls to
provide even minimal health benefits to its population.
Prospects for climbing out of this economic hole are dim.
Each day in Puerto Rico, eleven people or families lose their
105
homes because of inability to meet their mortgage payments.
Almost half of the population lives below the poverty level, as
compared to 15.5% nationally or 11% in Connecticut and 17%
106
in Oklahoma, states that receive $56 and $38 billion respectively in annual subsidies as compared to Puerto Rico’s $21 bil107
lion despite comparable populations. To this should be added
that the median household income in Puerto Rico is less than
$19,000, as compared to $70,000 and $48,000 in Connecticut
108
and Oklahoma, respectively, and does not go nearly as far as
income on the Mainland, given the many factors that raise the
cost of living in Puerto Rico above that in those states.
As previously explained, historically and presently, the
basic fundamental problem of the Puerto Rican economy has
always been that it is an economy that generates a significant
amount of wealth, but retains little of it, a typical colonial cir109
Puerto Rico’s principal industries—chemical,
cumstance.

104. Maria Levis, The Price of Inequality for Puerto Rico, HEALTH AFFAIRS
BLOG (Dec. 29, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/12/29/the-price-of
-inequality-for-puerto-rico.
105. 11 Puerto Ricans Per Day Lose Their Homes for Defaulting on Their
Mortgages, FOX NEWS LATINO (Feb. 17, 2016), http://latino/foxnews.com/
latino/news.
106. Poverty Status in the Past 12 Months, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2014)
[hereinafter Poverty Status], http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/
pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_14_5YR_S1701&prodType=table
(under
“Add/Remove Geographies,” select “State” then select “All States within the
United States and Puerto Rico”).
107. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CONSOLIDATED FEDERAL FUNDS REPORT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 1 tbl.1 (2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/
cffr-10.pdf.
108. Median Household Income (in 2014 Inflation-Adjusted Dollars), U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU (2014), http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/
pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_14_1YR_R1901.US01PRF&prodType=
table.
109. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, supra note 69, at 4 (“In analyzing the Puerto Rican economy, we keep in mind one of its unique features: a
substantial share of production is carried out by U.S. multinational corporations that took advantage of the sizable federal income tax benefits available
to firms located on the Island. The repatriation of the profits of these corporations to their parent firms on the U.S. mainland, in addition to a shifting of
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pharmaceutical, electronic, and scientific equipment manufacturing—are all dominated and driven by U.S.-based multinational corporations, whose net profits from their Puerto Rico
110
operations surpassed $14 billion in 1995 alone. It is the same
story when it comes to tourism, Puerto Rico’s second-biggest
industry, which employs nine percent of the work force, with
111
almost all hotels owned or controlled by stateside capital. Altogether, nearly four out of every ten dollars produced by Puer112
to Rican workers ends up in the coffers of a U.S. firm.
Added to this is an astonishing unemployment rate: Now
113
almost twelve percent, it has in the last ten years crept close
114
to seventeen percent and never gone lower than ten percent.
Puerto Rican unemployment remains five percent higher than
115
that of any U.S. state, or even Detroit, which recently filed for
bankruptcy under the sections of the Bankruptcy Code denied
116
to Puerto Rico. It is as a result of these forces and phenomena
that nearly half of Puerto Ricans live below the U.S. poverty
117
level. And it is as a result of endemic poverty and unemployment that several waves of Puerto Ricans have migrated to
118
other parts of the United States. The Island is experiencing
income by these U.S. corporations, leads to an overstatement of the amount of
income accruing to residents of Puerto Rico.”).
110. CARIBBEAN BUSINESS, THE PUERTO RICO INVESTOR’S GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT RESOURCES 5, 20–21 (2007).
111. See id.; FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, supra note 69, at 4.
112. See GOBIERNO DE PUERTO RICO OFICINA DEL GOBERNADOR JUNTA DE
PLANIFICACIÓN, Impacto del Sector Externo en la Economía de Puerto Rico, in
INFORME ECONOMICO AL GOBERNADOR 1995, at 12 (1996), http://gis.jp.pr
.gov/Externo_Econ/Informes%20Econ%C3%B3micos%20al%20Gobernador/
Informe%20Econ%C3%B3mico%20al%20Gobernador%201995.pdf.
113. Economy at a Glance: Puerto Rico, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, http://
www.bls.gov/eag/eag.pr.htm (data extracted May 20, 2016) (showing the unemployment rate for March 2016 is 11.8%).
114. Local Area Unemployment Statistics: Puerto Rico, Databases, Tables &
Calculators by Subject, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/
timeseries/LASST720000000000003?data_tool=XGtable (data extracted May
24, 2016).
115. See Unemployment Rates for States, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS,
http://www.bls.gov/web/laus/laumstrk.htm (noting Alaska and Illinois with
unemployment rates of 6.6%) (last modified May 20, 2016).
116. See Economy at a Glance: Detroit-Livonia-Dearborn, MI, BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/eag/eag.mi_detroit_md.htm (data extracted May 18, 2016) (noting an unemployment rate of 6.4%).
117. See Poverty Status, supra note 106.
118. See generally THE PUERTO RICAN DIASPORA: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (Carmen Teresa Whalen & Victor Vázquez-Hernández, eds., 2005). The
first wave left shortly after the change in sovereignty; the second departed af-
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one such wave now: since 2010, more than 251,000 Puerto Ri119
cans have left the Island. Today, more Puerto Ricans reside
120
throughout the fifty states than in Puerto Rico.
Given this background, it was inevitable that Puerto Rico
would eventually face a grave fiscal crisis, one principally
caused and perpetuated by its politically castrated condition.
The crypto-plantation era left Puerto Rico and its population in
an economically depressed state. Congress’s repeal of Section
936, without providing any alternative to mitigate the resultant tremendous job losses, cut short the Island’s economic recovery; the Mainland economic recession devastated Puerto Rico’s already fragile colonially-dependent economy; and finally,
the massive exodus of Puerto Ricans seeking work elsewhere, a
large number of whom were highly skilled and productive, vastly reduced the Island’s tax base and decreased revenues. Altogether, these events had a negative, multiplying effect which
demolished the economic base of Puerto Rico and its government.
Unsurprisingly, Puerto Rico was left in the lurch by those
who previously profited from the good times of the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s. Although neither Puerto Rico nor any of its
121
instrumentalities had ever defaulted on any debt obligations,
several of the rating entities, led by Moody’s, progressively degraded Puerto Rico bonds for the first time in their history in
122
anticipation of a default. This had a snowball effect, triggering acceleration clauses, increasing the interest rates at which
the government can borrow money, reducing access to capital
markets, and further limiting the liquidity and financial flexibility of these entities. The events that have followed are matter the Second World War and the demise of the sugar industry. We are seeing
the third wave today.
119. Estimates of the Components of Resident Population Change: April 1,
2010 to July 1, 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=PEP_2015_PEPTCOMP&
prodType=table (data extracted May 26, 2016).
120. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Puerto Ricans Leave in Record Numbers for
Mainland U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.pewresearch
.org/fact-tank/2015/10/14/puerto-ricans-leave-in-record-numbers-for-mainland
-u-s.
121. Patrick Gillespie, Puerto Rico Just Defaulted for the First Time, CNN
MONEY (Aug. 3, 2015), http:///www.money.cnn.com/2015/08/03/investing/
puerto-rico-default.
122. S&P Downgrades Puerto Rico Debt to ‘CCC+’ from ‘B,’ REUTERS (Apr.
24, 2015, 9:25 PM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/article/usa-puertorico-sp
-idUSL1N0XM01l20150425.
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ters of public knowledge and need not be repeated in any detail
here.
The undeniable underlying fact and cause of the Island’s
dilemma is that there is an unquestionable democratic deficit
in the U.S.-P.R. relationship: This deficit simply cannot be seriously questioned in 2016, particularly since a majority of the
Puerto Rican electorate expressly rejected the present status in
123
the 2012 plebiscite.
V. CONCLUSION: THE CASE FOR AN END TO
COLONIALISM IN PUERTO RICO
Beyond the patently unconstitutional nature of this colonial regime, numerous international agreements that the United
States has entered into require it to take specific actions to end
this denigrating colonial relationship and grant political equali124
ty to all of its citizens. Leading this body of treaty law is the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
125
(ICCPR), an international agreement which had been ratified
by 104 nations by the time the United States Senate followed
126
suit on April 12, 1992. In unambiguous language the United
States agreed that “[a]ll peoples have the right to selfdetermination,” and that “[b]y virtue of that right they freely
127
determine their political status.” It also pledged that all citi128
zens “shall have” the right to vote and consented to the adoption of whatever laws or measures could be required to guaran129
tee that right, and all others in the ICCPR.

123. Condición Política Territorial Actual: Resumen, COMISIÓN ESTATAL DE
ELECCIONES DE PUERTO RICO, http://64.185.222.182/REYDI_NocheDelEvento
12/index.html#es/default/CONDICION_POLITICA_TERRITORIAL_ACTUAL
_ISLA.xml (last updated Nov. 16, 2012); Opciones No Territorialies: Resumen,
COMISIÓN ESTATAL DE ELECCIONES DE PUERTO RICO, http://64.185.222.182/
REYDI_NocheDelEvento12/index.html#es/default/OPCIONES_NO_TERRITO
RIALES_ISLA.xml (last updated Nov. 16, 2012).
124. Others include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217 (III) A (Dec. 12, 1948); Organization of American States [OAS], American
Declaration of Human Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res. XXX (1948); OAS,
Inter-American Democratic Charter, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1 (XXVIIIE/01) (2001).
125. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
126. See 138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4783 (1992).
127. ICCPR, supra note 125, at art. 1, cl. 1.
128. Id. at art. 25.
129. Id. at art. 2, cl. 2.
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The United States has not only failed to comply with these
clear treaty obligations, but it has actively opposed in the
courts any attempt to secure domestic implementation of its
provisions. We have the most notorious example of this in
130
Igartúa-de la Rosa v. United States, in which the First Circuit
ruled that the ICCPR’s language does not establish that the
treaty is “self-executing” and thus that these rights are not enforceable in the absence of domestic legislation to that effect.
This is a totally erroneous conclusion, for many reasons that
131
would require too much time to explain on this occasion. Suffice it to say for present purposes that this is a conclusion that
runs in direct contravention to the Senate’s acknowledgment at
the time of its ratification of the ICCPR that the federal government was, by virtue of the ratification, bound to enforce the
132
treaty. It is difficult to understand how a court could conclude
that the ICCPR, replete with “shall” language, is not binding
and self-executing. Puerto Rico’s colonial relationship with the
United States violates not only our constitutional law, but also
multiple international treaties that are now, by the Senate’s
133
own action, U.S. law.
Although the Puerto Rico political establishment undoubtedly bears at least some part of the blame for the present fiasco, this Article does not digress to discuss its role because, first
of all, such an incursion would entail a discussion without any
foreseeable end or productive result and second, more importantly, because in the end, if an end could be reached, the
answer would be, once again, that any role played by the establishment is attributable to, and dwarfed by, the principal underlying cause of Puerto Rico’s problems: its colonial condition.
While Puerto Rico’s political entities have necessarily played a
role, theirs has not only been a limited, parochial one, but, most
importantly, not a decisive one. Any distraction from that ultimate truth, that our colonial condition is the primary cause of
the debacle we now face, detracts from efforts to find a solution.

130. 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005).
131. See id. at 173–75 (Torruella, J., dissenting).
132. “[T]he United States understands that this Covenant shall be implemented by the Federal Government.” 138 CONG. REC. S4781, S4784 (1992)
(emphasis added).
133. “[A]ll Treaties made or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land, and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
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There is also little doubt as to the appropriate path to ending Puerto Rico’s perennial colonialism. At the risk of oversimplifying a problem that is hardly simple or easy to solve, I venture to suggest that what we have here is a massive civil rights
issue, which can only be ameliorated by adopting a civil rights
agenda, and by engaging in the types of actions that have proven effective in promoting civil rights. We need not reinvent the
wheel. There are plenty of successes from which to draw examples and inspiration. It is high time that Puerto Ricans unite
their efforts along this front. Such a movement is, if anything,
past due.
I conclude with one final observation: If history teaches us
anything, it is that extreme actions provoke extreme responses.
Any creature, backed into a corner, will defend itself. If Congress continues on its present path, if PROMESA is any reflection of Congress’s intentions with respect to Puerto Rico, legislators should beware that their abusive actions do not trigger,
more than simply civil disobedience or resistance, radicalization and outright violence of the type that Puerto Rico saw in
the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. There are murmurs and stirrings
already. We must hope that Congress and others in high places
take note and consider the potentially explosive consequences
of what Congress is PROMESA-ing to Puerto Rico and its U.S.
citizen population, which is, even in the context of a relationship as exploitative as that of the United States with regard to
Puerto Rico, nothing short of shocking.

